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INTRODUCTION 
Santa Monica is committed to expanding affordable housing and helping 
residents stay in their homes. The City has dedicated countless hours, as well as 
millions of dollars, to preserving and producing housing within its roughly 8.3 
square miles. Rising residential rents and real estate prices, however, have led 
some to declare a “housing crisis” across Los Angeles County; and an ever-
expanding short-term rental industry creates new incentives for landlords to evade 
rent control laws, evict tenants, and convert residential units into de facto hotels, 
threatening also to undermine community ties in residential neighborhoods.  
In this context, Santa Monica adopted the “Home-Sharing Ordinance” (the 
“Ordinance”), which strikes a balance by allowing residents to supplement income 
through home-sharing, inviting guests into a home for profit while the resident is 
present, but prohibiting short-term vacation rentals where the resident is not 
present in the home. The Ordinance also regulates “hosting platforms”, like 
Appellants, who have contributed to the proliferation of illegal short-term vacation 
rentals. The Ordinance prohibits any “hosting platform[]” from “complet[ing] any 
booking transaction for any residential property or unit unless it is listed on the 
City’s registry . . . at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking 
transaction.” Santa Monica Municipal Code (“SMMC”) 6.20.050(c), ER-34-35. 
Appellants assert the Ordinance runs afoul of Section 230 of the 
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  2 
Communications Decency Act because, “as a practical matter,” it “would compel 
the platforms to remove third-party content to prevent their websites from 
becoming littered with unbookable listings.” Appellant’s Opening Brief (“AOB”) 
13 (emphasis in original). Two district courts have rejected this argument, properly 
holding that Section 230 protects only publishing activity and the Ordinance 
“creates no obligation on [Appellants’] part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the 
content supplied by hosts.” Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 3, 9-11; see also Airbnb, 
Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F.Supp.3d 1066, 1072-76 (N.D. Cal. 
2016) (hereafter “Airbnb”).  
Appellants further suggest that Section 230’s reach must be extended 
because, absent protection, Appellants and their peers will be subject to 
“idiosyncratic” or “numerous (and varied)” regulatory regimes. AOB-at 22. 
Appellants’ interest in extending the reach of Section 230 is clear. Construed as 
Appellants suggest, Section 230 would exempt online booking platforms from 
virtually all regulation, granting additional competitive advantage to online 
companies as compared to their brick-and-mortar counterparts and allowing online 
businesses uniquely to write their own rules of conduct. A plain application of the 
law, however, will not bring the result Appellants fear. That Congress did not draft 
Section 230 to protect Appellants from penalties for unlawful financial transactions 
does not mean that Congress could not; and Santa Monica, like other state and 
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local governments, seeks constructive partnership, not unreasonableness, in 
drafting its laws.  
Because Appellants’ claims under the First Amendment and the California 
Coastal Act also lack merit for the reasons set forth below, this Court should affirm 
the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The City agrees with Appellants’ statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion to deny a 
preliminary injunction precluding enforcement of Santa Monica’s Home-Sharing 
Ordinance (“the Ordinance”), where: 
1. It correctly held that the Ordinance regulates only non-publishing 
conduct that falls outside the scope of any protection conferred by 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act;  
2. It correctly held that the Ordinance does not violate the First 
Amendment because it imposes only incidental burdens on 
commercial speech;  
3. It correctly determined that Appellants failed to meet their burden to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success in their claim that the Ordinance 
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conflicts with the California Coastal Act or required Coastal 
Commission approval; and 
4. The balance of hardships and the public interest, factors not reached 
by the district court, tip in the City’s favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Santa Monica is a California municipality occupying slightly more than 
eight square miles with a resident and visitor population of up to 500,000 people 
daily. ER-19. A small city without room to expand, the City has consistently 
dedicated policies and resources to promoting the preservation, production, and 
affordability of housing, and protecting the quality and character of its residential 
neighborhoods. See, e.g., ER-656, 662, 675-80, 692-693; see also Nash v. City of 
Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97, 100 (1984) (upholding City’s rent control ordinance 
and describing “Demolition Derby” that resulted in City’s loss of over 1,300 
residential units to condominium conversions during 15-month period in 1970s). 
Consistent with its efforts to preserve and protect housing, the City has 
prohibited short-term vacation rentals within its residential neighborhoods since at 
least 1988. See discussion in Argument § III.B.1 below. Short-term rentals threaten 
to reduce housing supply, particularly affordable housing, by converting residential 
homes and apartments to tourist use. ER-1138, 1144-1145, 1148, 1151. 
Additionally, the “‘residential character’ of a neighborhood is threatened when a 
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significant number of homes . . . are occupied not by permanent residents but by a 
stream of tenants staying a weekend, a week, or even 29 days, . . . [as] such rentals 
undoubtedly affect the essential character of a neighborhood and the stability of a 
community.” Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 234 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1591 
(1991).  
Appellants have been operating commercial online platforms facilitating 
short-term rentals since 2006 and 2008. ER-1868 (HomeAway FAC ¶ 16); ER-
1836 (Airbnb FAC ¶ 27). Airbnb matches hosts and guests, completes booking 
transactions for short-term rentals, and extracts a service fee from both hosts and 
guests. ER-1837 (Airbnb FAC ¶ 29). Airbnb chooses not to charge for 
advertisements, and instead to collect fees on booking transactions, because it 
believes this business method to be more “convenient” for its users and more likely 
to result in an increased number of transactions on which it may charge a 
percentage. Id. HomeAway operates using two different business models: a pay-
per-booking option (similar to Airbnb’s approach), or a subscription option under 
which hosts pay HomeAway fees to list their units on HomeAway’s website. ER-
1869 (HomeAway FAC ¶ 21). 
In May 2015, in the midst of a continuing statewide housing crisis 
exacerbated by a burgeoning short-term rental industry, the Santa Monica City 
Council reconsidered its longstanding prohibition on short-term rentals. Carefully 
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weighing harms and benefits, the City adopted Ordinance 2484 which expressly 
adopted and reaffirmed the City’s longstanding prohibition against “Vacation 
Rentals,” defined as rentals of residential property for 31 consecutive days or less 
in which residents do not remain within their units to host guests. Sections 
6.20.010(c), 6.20.030; ER-22-23, 24. But it newly authorized “Home Sharing,” 
allowing residents to host visitors for compensation for a period of less than thirty-
one days, so long as residents obtain a business license and remain on-site 
throughout the visitors’ stay. Sections 6.20.010(a), 6.20.020; ER-22-23; see also 
ER-1058-1059, 1062, 1078. In this manner, Ordinance 2484 enabled residents to 
supplement income to meet increased rents and housing prices, while it ensured 
that Santa Monica’s housing units, and particularly affordable units, would not be 
surreptitiously or openly converted into de facto hotels.  
Two sections of Ordinance 2484 placed specific prohibitions or 
responsibilities on online “hosting platforms” such as Appellants. See Section 
6.20.010(b); ER-22 (defining “Hosting Platform”). Section 6.20.030 prohibited 
hosting platforms from advertising, or assisting in advertising, vacation rentals or 
unlawful home-sharing. ER-24. Section 6.20.050 required hosting platforms to: (1) 
collect and remit applicable Transient Occupancy Tax; and (2) disclose on a 
regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing within the City, 
together with certain information about each such listing and any bookings of those 
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listings. Id. 
Appellants filed challenges to Ordinance 2484. On September 21, 2016, the 
parties agreed to stay the cases to allow the City to prepare and consider 
amendments to Ordinance 2484 to address Appellants’ challenges. ER-1885 (Dkt. 
21), ER-1900 (Dkt. No. 20).  
During this period, Appellants were also challenging the City and County of 
San Francisco’s short-term rental laws in the Northern District of California. On 
November 8, 2016, District Judge James Donato issued a published opinion 
finding that Appellants had established neither a likelihood of success on the 
merits nor questions serious enough to require litigation, and denying Appellant’s 
request for a preliminary injunction with respect to their CDA and First 
Amendment challenges. Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1072-76 (CDA), 1076-79 (First 
Amendment), 1080.1 Appellants appealed but then entered a public settlement in 
which they agreed to comply with San Francisco’s laws and cease booking 
                                           
1On November 18, 2016, based on San Francisco’s acknowledgment that 
“an effective registration verification procedure is not up and running,” the court 
issued a temporary restraining order barring enforcement. ER-60-62. In issuing the 
restraining order, the court reiterated its prior determination “that plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment and CDA claims did not show a likelihood of success on the merits or 
raise serious questions requirement more litigation,” and made clear that the 
restraining order went “only to the serious questions relating to fair enforcement.” 
ER-62. Here, to facilitate compliance and enforcement, the City publishes its 
registry of licensed home-sharing hosts and their properties online. See SMMC § 
6.20.020(b), ER-34; see also n.3 below.  
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transactions with unregistered rental properties in San Francisco, subject to 
enforcement procedures set forth in the settlement agreement. ER-64-78. 
On January 24, 2017, Santa Monica adopted Ordinance 2535, which 
amended Ordinance 2484 and SMMC Chapter 6.20 to limit their application to 
hosting platforms such as Appellants in accordance with those aspects of the San 
Francisco ordinance upheld in the Northern District of California. ER-29-39. 
Ordinance 2484 as amended by Ordinance 2535 is codified at SMMC Chapter 6.20 
and referred to herein as “the Ordinance.”  
The Ordinance imposes obligations only on hosting platforms that 
participate “in the home-sharing or vacation rental business by collecting or 
receiving a fee, directly or indirectly through an agent or intermediary, for 
conducting a booking transaction using any medium of facilitation.” SMMC 
§6.20.010(c) (defining “Hosting Platform”), ER-32; see also ER-1313 (staff report 
explaining amended ordinance would not regulate platforms that “do not charge for 
booking services” but rather “act solely as publishers of advertisements for short 
term rentals”).  
The Ordinance imposes four obligations on this limited set of hosting 
platforms: (1) to collect and remit applicable Transient Occupancy Tax; (2) to 
disclose on a regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing within the 
City, together with certain information about each such listing and any bookings of 
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those listings; (3) not to complete any booking transaction for any residential 
property or unit unless it is listed on the City-created registry of validly licensed 
home-sharing properties; and (4) not to collect any fees for facilitating or providing 
services such as insurance, catering, entertainment, cleaning, property 
management, or maintenance for any vacation rental or unregistered home-sharing 
properties. SMMC §6.20.050, ER-34-35. 
The Ordinance does not prohibit the publication of, or require the 
monitoring or removal of, content provided to Appellants by third-party hosts. 
Indeed, the Ordinance includes a “Safe Harbor” provision stating that any online 
hosting platform that complies with the four responsibilities described above will 
be presumed to be in compliance with the law, making clear that they could not be 
held liable based on activities of hosts that may publish listings on their sites. 
SMMC §6.20.050(e), ER-35. Nor does the Ordinance require hosting platforms to 
engage in ongoing monitoring or verification of content provided by third-party 
hosts. Rather, to facilitate compliance and enforcement, the City publishes its 
registry of licensed home-sharing hosts and their properties online (see 
https://data.smgov.net/Permits-Licenses/Home-Sharing-Registry/qza6-nc9s) where 
it is readily available to Appellants. See SMMC §6.20.020(b), ER-34. 
 At the time of the hearing on their preliminary injunction motion, 
Appellants continued to facilitate the majority of known short-term rentals—both 
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lawful and unlawful—in Santa Monica. ER-1617 ¶ 5. The City has 196 licensed 
home-sharing hosts, 90% of whom advertise on Appellants’ platforms. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. 
In May 2017, one of Santa Monica’s peak tourist months, Airbnb had 
approximately 950 short-term rental listings for Santa Monica, well in excess of 
the number of licensed home-sharing properties. ER-1618 ¶ 8.2 Between 
November 2015 and October 2017, Airbnb and its hosts collected approximately 
$15.5 million a year from Santa Monica short-term rentals, the majority of which 
operated without complying with the Ordinance. ER-1617-1618 ¶¶ 5, 8, 13. 
As Appellants continue to receive a financial windfall by conducting 
booking transactions for unlawful rentals in the City, the threat short-term rentals 
pose to the City’s housing stock continues. ER-1625 ¶¶ 6, 7. Throughout 
California, housing production has been outpaced by population growth, adding to 
the housing affordability crisis. ER-1625 ¶ 8. The City has seen 2,272 rental 
housing units withdrawn from the permanent rental market through the Ellis Act, 
Cal. Gov’t Code §§7060 et seq., since 1986. ER-1613 ¶ 8. A disproportionate 
number of removed units were in the City’s Coastal Zone. ER-1613 ¶ 9. It is 
estimated that over 300 short-term rentals operated within rent-controlled units 
between 2015-2017, increasing the concern that short-term rentals threaten a loss 
                                           
2 Airbnb asserts that there are currently approximately 1,400 listings in Santa 
Monica. ER-393 ¶ 15. The City has been unable to verify this number. ER-1618 ¶ 
12.  
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of affordable rental units available to City residents. ER-1618 ¶ 11; ER-1625 ¶ 7.3 
On December 13, 2017, Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction 
arguing that the Ordinance violated the California Coastal Act, the CDA, and the 
First Amendment. ER-1891 (Dkt. No. 57). On March 12, 2018, the district court 
found no likelihood of success on the merits and denied Appellants’ motion. ER-1-
12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Unregulated short-term rentals seriously impact communities, 
neighborhoods, and affordable housing stock in Santa Monica. In crafting a 
legislative solution, the City sought to regulate hosting platforms that have 
facilitated the proliferation of short-term rentals, and looked to the courts for 
delineation of the boundaries of its authority under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Judge Donato’s decision in Airbnb 
recognized that local law could regulate hosting platforms’ own non-publishing 
conduct, following an unbroken line of guidance from this Court. See Doe v. 
Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (hereafter “Internet 
                                           
3 Santa Monica is only one of many cities noting the deleterious effect 
Appellants’ facilitation of home sharing has on communities, especially with 
respect to permanent housing. See, e.g., Johanna Interian, Up in the Air: 
Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 129, 156–57 (2016). 
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Brands”); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2008) (hereafter “Roommates.com”); Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009) (hereafter “Barnes”). The 
Ordinance therefore unremarkably regulates non-publishing conduct (hosting 
platforms’ facilitation and completion of booking transactions) while leaving 
publishing conduct untouched. The Ordinance does not regulate platforms’ 
publication of listings at all and does not require platforms to screen, monitor, edit 
or remove any listing, legal or illegal. Platforms simply may not take the additional 
and affirmative step of brokering an illegal rental through their websites.  
There is nothing too “creative,” “clever” or “backdoor” about the City 
scrupulously following guidance from statutory text, as clarified by the courts. 
AOB-at 1, 5, 25, 26. It is Appellants who seek to have this Court depart from its 
prior precedent and create new law. Construed as expansively as Appellants 
suggest, Section 230 would offer booking platforms virtually limitless protection 
for all their activities, including non-publishing activities, so long as they could be 
characterized as deriving from publishing activity “as a practical matter” or “in 
effect.” See AOB-at 2, 23, 27. Congress did not draft Section 230 this broadly, and 
this Court has squarely rejected such an expansive reading of its reach. See Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (“CDA does not provide a general immunity against all 
claims derived from third-party content”).  
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Appellants’ First Amendment argument fails for similar reasons. The 
Ordinance regulates Appellants’ commercial conduct (its participation in booking 
transactions), not speech. And the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions 
directed at commercial conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech, 
particularly commercial speech promoting illegal commercial activity such as host 
postings for illegal vacation rentals. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (no 
constitutional protection for “commercial speech related to illegal activity”).  
Appellants’ California Coastal Act claim also fails. The Ordinance reflects a 
balancing of interests entirely consistent with the multiple purposes of the Coastal 
Act, is local land use legislation not subject to Coastal Commission review, and is 
neither development nor an amendment to the City’s Land Use Plan that would 
require approval by the Coastal Commission. The district court correctly concluded 
that Appellants had failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success in this complex 
area of state law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 
635 (9th Cir. 2015). In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, this 
Court applies a two-part test: “first, determining whether the trial court identified 
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the correct legal rule to apply to the requested relief and second, determining 
whether the court’s application of that rule was illogical, implausible, or without 
support from inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” Pacific 
Radiation, 810 F.3d at 635. The district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 
1105 (9th Cir. 2012).  
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,” Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008), that should be entered only “upon a clear 
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary 
injunction must show (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of 
equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Pimentel, 
670 F.3d at 1105. Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of 
these factors; “if a movant fails to meet this ‘threshold inquiry,’ the court need not 
consider the other factors in the absence of ‘serious questions going to the merits.’” 
Disney Enterprises v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations 
omitted). Where questions go to the merits, a preliminary injunction may be 
appropriate only if “the balance of hardships . . . tips sharply towards” it and the 
other factors are satisfied. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ORDINANCE REGULATES NON-PUBLISHING CONDUCT, 
OUTSIDE THE LIMITED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY SECTION 
230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Two federal district courts have found that a local law that holds Appellants 
liable only “for their own conduct, namely for providing, and collecting a fee for, 
Booking Services in connection with” unregistered or unlicensed units “does not 
regulate what can or cannot be said or posted” and “creates no obligation on 
plaintiffs’ part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the content supplied by hosts.” 
ER-10 (Order Denying Preliminary Injunction) (citing Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1072–73). These findings are entirely correct. The Ordinance prohibits only active 
participation in illegal booking transactions, which is non-publishing conduct by 
Appellants that falls outside the scope of Section 230 protection. Id.  
A. Section 230 Protection Is Expressly Limited to Publishing 
Activities 
Section 230 is “not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” 
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852-53; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163. It is not 
“an all-purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on 
the internet,” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853, and it does not declare “a general 
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immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.” Id. at 852 (quoting 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100); accord City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 
363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Chicago”). Rather, the statute’s protection must be 
limited to “its narrow language and its purpose.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. 
As this Court has repeatedly cautioned, “we must be careful not to exceed the 
scope of the immunity provided by Congress.” Id. at 853 (quoting 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15).4  
In construing a statute, courts “first look to the language of the statute to 
determine whether it has a plain meaning.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009). “The preeminent canon of statutory 
interpretation requires us to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there. Thus, our inquiry begins with the 
statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” McDonald v. Sun 
Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)(citation and internal quotation marks 
                                           
4 Appellants’ cite Roommates.com as emphasizing Section 230’s “broad 
grant” of immunity, and as a result holding that “close cases . . . must be resolved 
in favor of immunity.” AOB-17. A partially concurring minority opinion, however, 
took the majority to task for ostensibly upending “the settled view that interactive 
service providers enjoy broad immunity.” 521 F.3d at 1176. And the statement that 
close cases should be resolved in favor of immunity came in the context of 
addressing whether the website’s actions should cause it to be treated as an 
information content provider, 521 F.3d at 1174-75, a matter not at issue in this 
appeal. See n.7 below. Moreover, as discussed below, that the Ordinance does not 
penalize publishing activities is not a close question.  
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omitted).  
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” This Court held that the text 
means what it says and protects from liability only: (1) “a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service” (2) “whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law 
cause of action, as a publisher or speaker” (3) “of information provided by another 
information content provider.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850 (quoting Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1100–01).5 
The district courts in this case and Airbnb heeded this Court’s admonitions 
in recognizing that the plain text of Section 230 protects online businesses from 
liability arising from publishing activities, but nothing more. Appellants portray 
both decisions as wrongly-decided outliers. AOB-39-423. But, both are 
                                           
5 The City does not dispute that Appellants are providers of an interactive 
computer service. Appellants argue that the third factor is also “indisputably met.” 
AOB-16. In the district court, the City reserved its argument on this point (ER-618 
n.7), and the court did not address it. Given this procedural posture, the City does 
not here contend that the third prerequisite is absent because Appellants should be 
considered “information content providers” under Section 230(f)(3). As in the 
district court, the City reserves the right to develop the factual basis for and present 
this argument in any other proceedings. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 
1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2016) (hereafter “Kimzey”) (“[C]ases establish that a website 
may lose immunity under the CDA by making a material contribution into the 
creation or development of content.”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68 (“[A] 
website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to 
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”). 
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straightforward applications of this Court’s precedent to nearly identical facts and 
claims. As Airbnb explains, the cases cited by Appellants do not contradict Barnes, 
Roommates.com, and Internet Brands, all of which instruct that the correct test is 
“not whether a challenged activity merely bears some connection to online content; 
[i]t is whether a regulation or claim ‘inherently requires the court to treat’ the 
‘interactive computer service’ as a publisher or speaker of information provided by 
another.” 217 F.Supp.3d at 1074 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102); see also 
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850. The district court in this case correctly followed 
this precedent.  
B. The Ordinance Penalizes Only Non-Publishing Conduct Outside 
of Section 230’s Limited Protection  
The Ordinance was drafted to regulate Appellants’ activities in accordance 
with the limits on Section 230’s protection recognized by this Court and others. 
Accordingly, the Ordinance prohibits and penalizes only non-publishing conduct: 
platforms direct activity conducting commercial booking transactions for 
unlicensed short-term rentals.  
This Court has defined publication activities protected by Section 230 as 
involving “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw 
from publication third-party content.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102; see also Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (“efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user 
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generated content”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (“any activity that can 
be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to 
post online”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“exercising the 
usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material.”).6 The district 
court correctly found that the Ordinance penalizes no such publication activities 
because it “creates no obligation on [Appellants’] part to monitor, edit, withdraw 
or block the content supplied by hosts.” ER-10 (quoting Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1072-73). 
Appellants argue that the district court was incorrect, and that the Ordinance 
requires them to monitor, review, and remove third-party listings. AOB-at 18, 21, 
22-24. Though they do not contend that the Ordinance on its face requires any of 
these actions, Appellants make two arguments to support their claim. 
First, Appellants contend that the City “admits” that the Ordinance requires 
                                           
6 Other courts have similarly described publishing activity as involving 
decisions about what third-party content may be posted online. See, e.g., Jones v. 
Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone, or alter content”) (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (“making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of 
content”); Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
422 (1st Cir. 2007) (“decision not to reduce misinformation [contained in third-
party postings] by changing its web site policies”); Green v. America Online, 318 
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (“monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from 
its network”). 
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them “to monitor and review third-party content” and that this admission is “fatal” 
to the City’s position. AOB-at 21. To support this argument, Appellants cite a 
sentence from the City’s briefing below: “True, in order to provide booking 
services in connection with a unit, Plaintiffs will have to determine whether the 
unit is properly licensed for rental.” ER-617 (cited in AOB-at 18). That sentence 
says nothing about monitoring and reviewing third-party listings. It is contained 
within a paragraph that begins: “The Home-Sharing ordinance also does not 
require Plaintiffs to monitor and review listings.” Id. Given the context, there is no 
basis for the claim that the cited sentence constitutes an admission by the City that 
the Ordinance requires monitoring and review of third-party listings. Indeed, at the 
City’s urging, the district court expressly found to the contrary. ER-3, 10.7  
Second, Appellants contend that, “effectively,” the only way to comply with 
the Ordinance is to “scrutinize third-party listings to determine whether the listed 
properties appear on the Santa Monica registry” and then remove or refuse to 
                                           
7 Relying on a series of cases criticizing and disregarding civil plaintiffs’ 
efforts at “creative pleading in an effort to work around” Section 230 protections, 
Appellants contend the Ordinance’s express limitations to booking transactions 
should similarly be disregarded. AOB-at 24-25 & n.4, 28. This argument is 
unfounded. The City made no secret of its desire to regulate Appellants’ activities, 
and so limit their transactions facilitating illegal home-sharing, to the extent 
permitted under Section 230 and other law. The City’s modification of the 
Ordinance to accord with the San Francisco law upheld against a CDA challenge is 
neither “disingenuous” nor an example of “artful pleading” that should be 
disregarded. Instead, it is a valid effort to conform regulation to existing law.  
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accept those that do not appear on the registry. AOB-at 21, 23. Appellants cite to 
two declarations submitted by Airbnb’s Head of Policy Strategy (ER-395) and a 
HomeAway Vice President (ER-504). See AOB-at 21, 23. Both make clear that the 
referenced scrutiny could occur “after publication but prior to processing the 
payment and transaction for the listing.” ER-395; see also ER-504. Moreover, 
given Santa Monica’s public posting of its registry of licensed home-sharers, 
which lists property addresses, all Appellants would need to do, at the time of a 
proposed booking transaction, is compare the address of the proposed booking 
with the online registry to confirm that the property is registered. This limited 
check relates to a decision not whether to remove posted listings, but instead 
whether to proceed with a booking transaction; it therefore does not constitute 
publishing activity protected by Section 230.  
Both declarations assert that for business reasons, Appellants do not find 
viable the option of checking addresses against the registry at the time of the 
booking transaction, and would instead likely comply either by monitoring and 
screening listings prior to publication, removing those listings not on the registry, 
or by ceasing to operate in Santa Monica. ER-395; ER-504. Appellants argue this 
establishes they have no choice but to engage in review and removal if they are to 
avoid liability, citing National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012). 
AOB-at 26-27. That case generally instructs that preemption analysis may include 
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the “practical effect” of a challenged law. Appellant’s similar contention regarding 
the San Francisco ordinance was squarely rejected. See Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1074-75. The reasons cited by the San Francisco court apply here as well: there are 
options for compliance other than review and removal; National Meat involved a 
statute under which preemption is different from and potentially much broader than 
under the CDA, particularly given this Court’s express caution against applying 
CDA protection “beyond its narrow language and its purpose,” Internet Brands, 
824 F.3d at 853; and cases that have construed National Meat in other contexts 
have limited it to its particular facts.8 
Complying with the ordinance through independent, post-publication checks 
in connection with authorizing booking transactions may impose costs, whether 
directly by causing Appellants to expend funds to modify their software and 
implement procedures for these checks, or indirectly by affecting Appellants’ 
relationships with hosts or vacation renters who are upset when they find 
themselves unable to complete illegal booking transactions through Appellants’ 
                                           
8Appellants also cite Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel Johnson, 568 U.S. 627 (2013). 
AOB-25-26, 27. The San Francisco court’s reasons for distinguishing National 
Meat apply equally to Wos, which relied on National Meat to preempt a North 
Carolina statute that, in certain circumstances, operated “to allow the State to take 
one-third of the total recovery, even if a proper stipulation or judgement attributes 
a smaller percentage to medical expenses,” thus creating a direct “conflict” 
between “North Carolina’s law and the Medicaid anti-lien provision,” which 
limited liens to actual recoveries of medical expenses. Wos, 568 U.S. at 638.  
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sites. Such costs are a common result of regulatory compliance. E.g., United States 
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 883 (1996) (“all regulations have their costs”). 
Appellants’ declarations state that given the indirect regulatory costs, Appellants 
are likely, for business reasons, to pursue a different method of compliance, 
monitoring and removing illegal listings before booking transactions are attempted 
and aborted. Such a voluntary choice to engage in publishing activity as a means of 
minimizing regulatory costs does not convert the Ordinance into one that targets or 
requires that publishing activity.  
Moreover, extending CDA protection based on the costs of regulatory 
compliance would give Appellants an unjustified business advantage over potential 
competitors. The Ordinance applies to all hosting services, whether online or not. 
SMMC 6.20.010(b), ER-32. Expanding CDA protection based on Appellants’ 
desire to avoid regulatory costs would improperly carve out favorable treatment for 
them, as online companies, that booking service providers not based on the Internet 
would not enjoy. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15 (CDA immunity 
should not be applied to “give online businesses an unfair advantage over their 
real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general applicability”). 
Such a competitive advantage would be particularly unwarranted given the 
internet’s status as “the dominant -- perhaps the preeminent -- means through 
which commerce is conducted.” Id. 
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C. The Cases on Which Appellants Rely Simply Confirm that 
Section 230 Protection Is Limited to Publishing Activities 
This Court has consistently declined to extend Section 230 protection 
beyond publication activities. In Internet Brands, this Court held a website could 
be liable for failing to warn users regarding a serial rapist it knew was using the 
website to hunt potential victims. 824 F.3d at 851. Section 230 did not immunize 
the website because the plaintiff did not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a 
“publisher or speaker,” but rather for its own non-publishing conduct. Id. In 
Barnes, for similar reasons, this Court concluded that the CDA did not preclude 
liability against Yahoo! for a breach of its promise to remove nude photographs 
from its website. 570 F.3d at 1107. 
Other Courts similarly have recognized that liability based on non-
publishing conduct—distinct from acts of publishing—is not entitled to Section 
230 protection. For example, in Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether 
Section 230 prevented the City of Chicago from imposing a tax on Internet auction 
sites. 624 F.3d at 365. The court concluded that Section 230 was “irrelevant” 
because Chicago’s “tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a 
‘speaker’.” Id. at 366. The tax liability was imposed based on StubHub’s conduct 
(Internet auction transactions) and had nothing to do with whether or how an 
auction offer was published. Appellants attempt to distinguish this case because it 
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“involved tax collection, not reviewing, monitoring, or removing, third-party 
content.” AOB-at 30 n. 6. But that is precisely the point: the internet sites could 
avoid Chicago’s tax liability by ceasing to conduct auction transactions without 
regard to who was the publisher or speaker of the auction listings, just as 
Appellants can avoid liability by ceasing to conduct booking transactions for 
illegal home-shares without regard to who is the publisher or speaker of home-
sharing listings. The publication of postings for sale of tickets (on StubHub) or 
postings for short-term rentals (on Appellants’ sites) is entirely separate. Like 
Chicago, this case does not involve any required review and removal of postings.9 
Appellants rely on a litany of federal and state cases that have found Section 
230 protection. AOB-17, 19 n.2, 20 n.3. All, however, “involved claims and 
regulations that would have imposed liability on the service provider as a publisher 
or speaker of content supplied by a third party.” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1073.10 
                                           
9 Other examples include Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., 194 F.Supp.3d 959, 967 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (Section 230 does not bar claim premised on Twitter’s 
redistribution, through automatic telephone dialing system, of unwanted messages 
to consumers in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act because 
claim “does not depend on the content of any tweet, or on any assertion that 
Twitter is required to sift through content to make sure the content is not bad”) and 
Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (liability is 
premised not on content of third-party created profiles but on “manner” of 
distribution of those profiles). 
 
10 The San Francisco district court distinguished Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (challenge to website features that “reflect choices 
about what content can appear on the website and in what form” which “are 
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Appellants contend that the decisions upholding Santa Monica’s and San 
Francisco’s ordinances rely on a distinction between websites that engage in 
commerce and those that do not. AOB-at 28. They neither draw nor require any 
                                           
editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions”); 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.Supp.2d 805, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (“sale 
of online advertisements” “derives from a website’s status and conduct as an 
online publisher of classified advertisements”); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 
881 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (Washington state law imposed 
criminal liability on websites for “publishing, disseminating, or displaying” 
information “created by third parties -- namely ads for commercial sex acts 
depicting minors”); and Goddard v. Google, No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 
5245490 at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (plaintiff sought to hold Google liable 
for fraud committed by third-party advertisers). Other cases cited by Appellants are 
similarly distinguishable because they involved claims premised on websites’ 
permitting to be posted or failing to remove third-party generated content. See 
Jones, 755 F.3d at 408-17 (defamation claims based on third party postings); Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (claims alleging negligent 
failure to implement safety measures to protect minors are “merely another way of 
claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing” online third-party generated 
content); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118-1119 (9th Cir. 
2007) (state law unfair competition and false advertising claims based on posting 
of images stolen from magazine and website); Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 
F.3d at 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (claim asserting AOL negligence in “promulgating 
harmful content and in failing to address certain harmful content on its network” is 
attempt to “hold AOL liable for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, 
and deletion of content from its network – actions quintessentially related to a 
publisher’s role”); Pennie v. Twitter, 281 F.Supp.3d 874, 889-90 (N.D. Cal. 2017), 
appeal filed, No. 17-17536 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017) (material support claims based 
on Twitter’s provision of accounts to Hamas -- “Plaintiffs explicitly base their 
claims on the content that Hamas allegedly posts” and “Defendants could only 
determine which accounts are affiliated with Hamas by reviewing the content 
published by those accounts”); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 
2009 WL 1704355 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (“alleged failure to block, 
screen, or otherwise prevent the dissemination of a third party’s content, i.e., the 
gun advertisement in question”). 
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such distinction. Monetizing online activity is not itself a reason to deny Section 
230 protection; rather, a platform operates outside the scope of that limited 
protection when it engages in activity that is not publishing activity. The cases 
cited by Appellants (AOB-29 n.5) first found that Section 230 protection existed in 
the first place, generally because each case addressed liability claims predicated on 
what were publishing activities; and only then held that a platform’s commercial 
profit from such publishing activities did not defeat Section 230’s otherwise 
applicable protection.11  
Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 
2000), and Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227 (2012) -- state cases that 
neither carry precedential weight here nor were controlled by this Court’s 
                                           
11 See Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F.Supp.3d 685, 690 (S.D. Miss. 
2014) (claims arise from publication of third-party information because Plaintiffs’ 
central allegation is that eBay permitted retailer “to advertise and sell the 
aforementioned recalled product to the Plaintiff through a listing on its auction 
website” after eBay knew or should have known of the recall); Evans v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 WL 5594717 at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
10, 2013) (state law claims based on content of app posted for sale by third party); 
Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at 
*2, *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (where eBay was “not involved in the actual 
transaction between buyers and sellers,” alleged sale of vacuum tubes “was 
facilitated by communication for which eBay may not be held liable under the 
CDA”); Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 305, 324 (Law. Div. 
2010) (online ticket broker protected by CDA because not responsible “for the 
creation or development of the alleged inaccurate or misleading ticket listings” 
posted by third-parties); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (no dispute that state law claims rested on Amazon’s 
publishing activities, and images at issue were provided by third-party vendors). 
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precedents -- are not to the contrary. Stoner, an unpublished California superior 
court opinion decided without the guidance of this Court’s subsequent decisions in 
Roommates.com, Barnes, and Internet Brands limiting the scope of Section 230’s 
protection, involved claims brought under California’s Unfair Competition Law 
alleging that eBay sold or caused the sale of “bootleg” recordings. Hill, a North 
Carolina Court of Appeals case, rejected a ticket buyer’s attempt to hold StubHub 
responsible for a ticket seller’s violation of a North Carolina anti-scalping law. 
Both courts determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on content 
provided by and liability directed at the seller. Stoner, WL 1705637 at *3; Hill, 219 
N.C. App. at 248-49. In contrast, the Ordinance does not impose liability on 
platforms based on content provided by short-term rental hosts; and neither Stoner 
nor Hill extended CDA protection to a law expressly limited to online brokers 
directly participating in illegal commercial booking transactions. 
Appellants point to three cases in which courts have found Section 230 to 
protect them specifically, but these cases are merely in line with the many that hold 
Section 230 precludes liability premised on failure to remove third-party postings. 
See MDA City Apartments, LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 2018 WL 910831 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
2018) (MDA alleged that “Airbnb Defendants can be held liable because the 
complained of listings are unlawful since they advertise rentals that violate the 
terms of MDA’s leases” and “Defendants have failed to remove such listings”); 
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Hiam v. Homeaway.com, Inc., 267 F.Supp.3d 338, 348 (D. Mass. 2017) (Section 
230 precludes liability for “misleading or inaccurate material” posted by 
Homeaway.com’s customers); Donaher v. Vannini, No. CV-16-0213, 2017 WL 
4518378 at *2 (Me. Super. Aug. 18, 2017) (“At the heart of plaintiff’s claims 
against Airbnb is their allegation that Airbnb failed to take down Vannini and 
Macri’s post offering plaintiff’s house [that they did not own] for rent on Airbnb’s 
website. A decision not to delete a particular posting is an editorial decision.”).  
Appellants also rely on La Park LaBrea A LLC, et al. v. Airbnb, Inc., et al., 
285 F.Supp.3d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed, No. 18-55113 (Jan. 26, 2018), 
which is almost identical to MDA City Apartments. In La Park LaBrea, the district 
court neither questioned nor disagreed with the San Francisco court’s ruling in 
Airbnb, instead distinguishing it by noting allegations in the complaint before it 
regarding Airbnb’s refusal to remove listings and continuing “to allow the listing 
to persist.” 285 F.Supp.3d at 1108. The court followed the San Francisco court in 
recognizing that “the correct test for CDA protection ‘is not whether a challenged 
activity merely bears some connection to online content’ but whether the claim 
‘inherently requires the court to treat the “interactive computer service” as a 
publisher or speaker of information provided by another.’” Id. (quoting Airbnb, 
217 F.Supp.3d at 1074). Relying on the particular allegations in the complaint, the 
court concluded that the claims before it satisfied this test. It is utterly 
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unremarkable that the courts in these cases found Section 230 protection to apply, 
just as it is utterly unhelpful to the present case.12 
Appellants cannot seriously dispute that Section 230 protection has limits. 
This Court has plainly defined those limits, applying Section 230 protection only to 
                                           
12 Appellants note that certain courts, “led by the First Circuit,” have applied 
Section 230 protection to “a website’s ‘overall design and operation’ with respect 
to third-party content, including features related to payment services.” AOB-30. 
The approach of these courts is consistent with this Circuit’s holdings regarding 
the limits on Section 230 protection because they too require a connection between 
a website’s “overall design and operation” and publishing activities related to 
third-party content. Thus, for example, in Doe v. Backpage, the First Circuit 
applied Section 230 protection to claims premised in part on design features 
alleged to encourage sex trafficking (including allowing third-party posters to pay 
anonymously for their actual posts) because those features reflected “choices about 
what content can appear on the website and in what form” which “are editorial 
choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions.” 817 F.3d at 
20-21. Similarly, the two other cases cited by Appellants involved websites’ 
operational decisions (whether to allow members of ISIS and Hamas to obtain and 
use accounts) that related directly to whether or not to allow particular third-party 
content to be posted, again, a traditional publishing function. See Fields v. Twitter, 
Inc., 217 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff'd on other grounds, 881 
F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (decision to decline to furnish account to particular user 
based on apparent ISIS affiliation would be “a publishing decision to prohibit the 
public dissemination of these ideas”); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F.Supp.3d 
140, 156-58 (E.D.N.Y 2017), motion to reconsider denied, Force v. Facebook, 
Inc., 2018 WL 472807 at *4, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-
397 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2018) (Facebook’s choices as to who (including Hamas) may 
use its platform and associated services “are inherently bound up in its decisions as 
to what may be said on its platform, and so liability imposed based on its failure to 
remove users would equally derive[] from [Facebook’s] status or conduct as a 
publisher or speaker”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). None of these 
cases raised or resolved the question posed here: whether Section 230 protects 
platforms from a law prohibiting the completion of a financial transaction for an 
unlawful activity. 
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publishing activities and refusing to apply it simply because a challenged activity 
“bears some connection to online content.” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.2d at 1072; see 
also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100. As this court has observed, “[p]ublishing activity is 
a but-for cause of just about everything [Appellants are] involved in. [They are] 
internet publishing business[es]. Without publishing user content, [they] would not 
exist. As noted above, however, we held in Barnes that the CDA does not provide 
a general immunity against all claims derived from third-party content.” Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. Appellants’ booking transactions that are the object of the 
Ordinance are not publishing activity, and therefore fall outside the limits of 
Section 230 protection.  
D. Appellants’ Argument Based on “Obstacle Preemption” Is 
Misplaced and Unpersuasive  
Appellants attempt to separate Congressional intent from Section 230’s text 
by making an argument based on “obstacle preemption.” AOB-at 32-39. But 
“federalism requires that we assume federal law was not intended to supersede the 
states’ historic police powers ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.” Arellano v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, 875 F.3d 1213, 
1216 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, courts “read even express preemption provisions 
narrowly,” using as the “ultimate touchstone” the actual purpose of Congress. Id. at 
1216-17. 
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Congressional intent in enacting section 230 is well-established--to 
“promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet,” Carafano 
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003), protect internet 
service providers from liability for “other parties’ potentially injurious messages,” 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31, and “encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or 
obscene material.” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. These concerns are affirmed by 
Section 230(c)’s title, “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material,” which this Court has opined reflects intent not to protect 
internet operators engaged in commercial, transactional activities in flagrant 
disregard of the law, but rather to allow and encourage online providers to act 
voluntarily as publishers without fear of liability to take steps to ferret out 
defamatory or otherwise unlawful speech. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163-64. 
These speech and information-based concerns are reiterated in Congressional 
findings in Section 230(a). See 47 U.S.C. §230(a). In accord with these findings 
regarding the potential political, educational, and informational benefits of the 
then-nascent internet, Congress stated its policy goals of promoting “the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services” and 
preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. §230(b).  
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Congress nowhere articulated a policy or intent to exempt online service 
providers engaged in non-publishing activity from reasonable regulation of that 
activity simply because it takes place, or is based on information posted, on the 
Internet. 13 Nor has this Circuit succumbed to online businesses’ attempts to expand 
the law to that effect:  
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of 
communication that could easily be smothered in the 
cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations 
applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has 
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means 
through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach 
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful 
not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by 
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair 
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must 
comply with laws of general applicability. 
 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15. If completing an illegal booking 
transaction “is prohibited when practiced in person or by telephone, [there is] no 
reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit from it 
                                           
13 Filing as an amicus on behalf of Appellants, former Congressman 
Christopher Cox cites both his personal motivations and his floor statements in the 
debate over Section 230’s adoption as support for extending it to preclude the 
Ordinance’s application to Appellants. E.g., Cox Amicus Brief at 4-5, 9, 10. 
Former congressman Cox’s statements in his amicus brief are entitled to no 
independent weight in interpreting Congress’s legislative intent in adopting the 
CDA. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 
118 (1980) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979)) (“even the 
contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not 
controlling in analyzing legislative history”). 
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online.” Id. at 1167. Unlawful commercial transactions “don’t magically become 
lawful when [conducted] electronically online.” Id.  
Online businesses have engaged in a thoughtful, concerted campaign to 
expand the reach of Section 230 protection. Their attempts to rewrite 
Congressional intent using judicial dicta accumulated over the two decades since 
enactment must be rejected. Batzel, for example, is frequently cited by Appellants 
for its brief statements that a purpose of Section 230 was to “promote the 
development of e-commerce” and that Congress sought to advance “e-commerce 
interests on the Internet.” See AOB-at 3, 29-30, 32, 34, 39. But commercial, non-
publishing activity was not at issue or even considered in Batzel, which reviewed 
denial of an anti-SLAPP motion and underlying defamation claims.  
Moreover, Appellant’s arguments in this regard have no limiting principle 
and rest on a fundamentally invalid assumption, namely, that regulations such as 
the Ordinance “purport[] to regulate transactions as a way to regulate content sub 
rosa.” AOB-at 37. Under this approach, any regulation addressing any 
transactional activity dependent on a third-party posting would arguably fall within 
Section 230’s protection. This Court has expressly rejected this broad an approach. 
See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (not enough that action as “publisher or 
speaker” of user content is “but-for” cause of conduct resulting in liability because 
“CDA does not provide a general immunity against all claims derived from third-
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party content” and court must “be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity 
provided by Congress”); see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (“[p]roviding 
immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from third parties would 
eviscerate the exception to section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in 
whole or in part.’”) (citation omitted). Such a broad approach is similarly 
precluded by the plain text of Section 230, which, as this Court has repeatedly 
recognized, squarely limits the scope of the statutory protection to publishing 
activities, not transactional activities of the type regulated by the Ordinance.14  
II. THE ORDINANCE COMPORTS WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
The district court correctly determined that the Ordinance comports with the 
First Amendment. By prohibiting illegal booking transactions for unlicensed short-
term rentals, the Ordinance “regulates conduct, not speech.” ER-11. Any incidental 
burden on speech does not trigger First Amendment protection, as “restrictions on 
protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more 
                                           
14 The validity of this distinction, and the absence of limits on Appellants’ 
contrary position, are demonstrated by Doe v. Backpage, in which the court 
extended Section 230 protection to design features alleged to encourage sex 
trafficking, including allowing third-party posters to pay anonymously for their 
actual posts, because those features reflected “choices about what content can 
appear on the website and in what form.” 817 F.3d at 20-21. Appellants’ position 
would extend the protection even further, to a website’s participation in booking 
(and taking a percentage of the booking payment for) sex acts arising from the 
posts.  
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generally, on nonexpressive conduct,” and “the First Amendment does not prevent 
restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on 
speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). In any event, the 
Ordinance is narrowly drawn to advance the City’s significant government 
interests in preserving long-term housing, reducing evictions, and preserving the 
character and quality of life of Santa Monica’s residential neighborhoods. 
A. The Home-Sharing Ordinance Targets Conduct, Not Speech 
As two district courts have now concluded, “[a] booking transaction as 
defined and targeted by the Ordinance is a business transaction to secure a short-
term rental, not conduct with any significant expressive element.” ER-11; Airbnb, 
217 F.Supp.3d at 1076. By restricting such business transactions, the Ordinance 
neither restricts conduct “with a ‘significant expressive element’” nor “has the 
inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity.” 217 
F.Supp.3d at 1076 (quoting International Franchise Association v. City of Seattle, 
803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ordinance, put simply, “is directed at 
specific business transactions and practices, and ‘not to any message the businesses 
express.’” Id. at 1077 (quoting International Franchise, 803 F.3d at 409). 
Appellants’ attempt to blur this distinction by positioning themselves not as 
commercial operators but as traditionally protected First Amendment speakers and 
publishers. AOB-43-44. But Appellants are not news organizations, and the 
  Case: 18-55367, 05/16/2018, ID: 10875459, DktEntry: 30, Page 48 of 74
  37 
Ordinance has not imposed a tax on the very paper and ink with which they speak. 
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 585 (1983) (use tax on paper and ink that applied to only small number of 
newspapers was impermissible and implicated area where “First Amendment has 
its ‘fullest and most urgent’ application”); Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 109 
(3d Cir. 2004) (state statute prohibiting college newspapers from receiving 
payment for alcoholic beverage advertising violated First Amendment by imposing 
“special financial burdens on . . . a narrow sector of the media”). Appellants’ 
attempt to invoke the First Amendment protections accorded individuals engaged 
in door-to-door solicitation of charitable contributions, is similarly unavailing. See 
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 
(1980) (charitable appeals for funds are “characteristically intertwined with 
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or 
for particular views on economic, political, or social issues” and “[c]anvassers in 
such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money”). 
Appellants rely largely on Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), and Sorrell, to contend that the district 
court failed to consider the second half of the International Franchise test, namely, 
whether the “ordinance has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in 
expressive activity.” AOB-at 42-44 & n.15. But the laws in those cases targeted 
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expressive activity, not unlawful financial transactions. As Judge Donato 
explained, the New York “Son of Sam” law at issue in Simon & Schuster, Inc., by 
“restricting a criminal’s right to profit from literary or other works based on [a] 
crime,” “singled out income derived from classically ‘expressive activity’ (e.g., 
books, movies, magazines articles, or other ‘expression[s] of [an] accused or 
convicted person’s thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions’ about the crime), and 
was directed only at ‘works with a specified content’ (i.e., relating to the 
‘reenactment of [the] crime’).” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1077 (quoting Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 110, 116). Similarly, the Vermont statute at issue in 
Sorrell created content and speaker-based restrictions that could not withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny because the law “on its face ‘disfavor[ed] marketing, that is, 
speech with a particular content,’ and ‘more than that, . . . disfavor[ed] specific 
speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.’” Id. (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 
564). As Judge Donato correctly recognized, Simon & Schuster and Sorrell 
involved “core First Amendment concerns . . . not implicated by the Ordinance 
here.” Id. at 1077.  
The district court therefore properly concluded that the Ordinance, like San 
Francisco’s before it, “does not implicate expressive activity or speech.” ER-12; 
see also Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1077. 
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B. Any Incidental Burden Falls On Commercial Advertisements For 
Unlawful Activity Not Subject To First Amendment Protection 
Appellants argue that the “conduct/speech distinction” so firmly rooted in 
First Amendment law will “allow the government to ban a wide swath of otherwise 
protected speech, especially on the internet.” AOB-at 46. This presents no such 
threat. “To the limited extent the Ordinance might be said to affect speech, the 
impact or burden is purely incidental” and “involves speech that ‘does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.’” Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1078 (quoting 
Lone Star Security and Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1198 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted)). 
First Amendment concerns are even more lacking where the commercial 
speech on which any incidental impact falls relates to unlawful activity. “Any First 
Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial 
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting 
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and 
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic 
activity.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973). Put more succinctly, commercial speech that proposes an 
illegal transaction is excluded from First Amendment protection. See United States 
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (“offers to give or receive what it is 
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unlawful to possess have no social value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First 
Amendment protection”); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 (1980) (no 
constitutional protection for “commercial speech related to illegal activity”). 
Appellants argue that the Ordinance requires them to “‘investigate the 
advertisements they print,’ raising the risk that commercial speech will be 
‘impermissibly chill[ed].’” AOB-at 47 (quoting Braun v. Soldier of Fortune 
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Ordinance requires no 
such thing. As the district courts found, the Ordinance targets a business 
transaction -- completion of a booking transaction for an unlicensed and therefore 
unlawful rental -- and “does not limit [Appellants’] ability to publish 
advertisements for rentals that may violate the Ordinance” or require Appellants to 
“edit, withdraw, or block the content supplied by hosts.” ER-10, 11; see also 
Airbnb, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1078.15  
                                           
15 Contrary to Appellants’ claim (AOB-at 47), where a burden falls only 
incidentally on advertisements, those advertisements need not be “unlawful on 
their face” to ameliorate any First Amendment concerns. Pittsburgh Press itself 
addressed a situation where the “illegality” posed by the advertisements at issue 
was “less overt” -- they were not want ads “proposing a sale of narcotics or 
soliciting prostitutes,” but instead want ads for nonexempt employment placed in 
columns headed with the gender of the applicants being sought. 413 U.S. at 388-
89. In any event, unlike both Pittsburgh Press and Braun (the case on which 
Appellants primarily rely), where the publication of advertisements was itself the 
conduct giving rise to liability, here the Ordinance penalizes not the publication of 
advertisements (the home-share postings) but participation in subsequent booking 
transactions.  
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C. The Ordinance Is Narrowly Tailored To Serve A Substantial 
Government Interest 
Under Central Hudson, actual restrictions on commercial speech promoting 
lawful transactions, even if content-based, need only withstand intermediate 
scrutiny, that is, the restriction “must directly advance” a “substantial state 
interest” and must be “narrowly drawn” to “extend only as far as the interest it 
serves.” 447 U.S. at 564-65; see also Lone Star, 827 F.3d at 1198 n.3. Even were 
the Ordinance a content-based restriction, it would survive this scrutiny. It is a 
balanced local law that is narrowly drawn to advance substantial government 
interests in protecting affordable housing and preserving residential neighborhoods 
by preventing home-sharing or vacation rental from converting residential homes 
and apartments into de facto hotels.16  
The Ordinance is not, however, a content-based restriction on commercial 
speech, but rather a lawful restriction of purely commercial conduct with, at most, 
                                           
16 Appellants take issue not with the validity of the asserted interest, but with 
the Ordinance’s tailoring to serve that interest. In particular, Appellants assert that 
the Ordinance is under-inclusive because it does not apply to online bulletin board 
sites like Craigslist that “advertise the very same properties but have no booking 
functionality.” AOB-50. This limit on the Ordinance’s reach is the result of efforts 
to avoid potential conflict with Section 230. The City’s efforts to comply with 
Section 230 cannot be a basis for arguing, as Appellants do, that the Ordinance’s 
“under-inclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact 
pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker.” AOB-
50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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incidental effects on commercial advertisements for unlawful transactions. “Every 
civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment 
protected activities.” Arcara v Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986). The 
Ordinance falls well within the sphere of permissibility by penalizing only 
unlawful, non-expressive financial transactions in service of substantial 
governmental interests.  
D. The Ordinance Does Not Impose Strict Liability  
Appellants argue that the Ordinance also violates the First Amendment 
because it imposes “criminal penalties on publishers without any mens rea 
requirement.” AOB-at 51. This argument should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, for all the reasons discussed above, the Ordinance imposes liability on 
Appellants, not as publishers, but for engaging in and collecting fees for unlawful 
booking transactions and therefore penalizes only non-expressive commercial 
conduct. Second, the Ordinance itself contains narrowing provisions. See SMMC 
6.20.050(e) (“Safe Harbor”), (f) (“provisions of this section shall be interpreted in 
accordance with otherwise applicable state and federal law(s)”), ER-35. Finally, 
the California Supreme Court reads scienter into statutes with criminal penalties, 
see, e.g., Stark v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.4th 368, 393 (2011); People v. Salas, 37 
Cal.4th 967, 978 (2006), and the City stated in the district court that it would 
accept imputation of a scienter requirement here. ER-620; see also Airbnb., 217 
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F.Supp.3d at 1079-80 (noting that San Francisco accepted “imputation of a scienter 
requirement”).  
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN INJUNCTION 
BASED ON APPELLANTS’ CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT CLAIM 
The district court properly determined that Appellants failed to meet their 
burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on their pendent state law claim 
under the California Coastal Act of 1976, Cal. Pub. Res. Code (“CPRC”) §30000 
et seq. (the “Coastal Act”). The Coastal Act does not preempt the police powers of 
California municipalities absent a clear conflict. Id. §30005(a), (b); see also Cal. 
Const., Art. XI §7 (municipalities may make and enforce “all local, police, 
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws”). 
Rather, the Coastal Act provides the California Coastal Commission (“Coastal 
Commission”) with limited powers, namely, authority to review and certify a local 
land use plan (“LUP”), review and certify a local coastal program (“LCP”) and 
subsequent amendments thereto, and (in the absence of a certified LCP, as in Santa 
Monica’s case) grant or deny Coastal Development Permits (“CDPs”) for 
development within the Coastal Zone. See CPRC §§30512, 30512.2, 30513, 
30600. These enumerated powers are the full extent of the Commission’s relevant 
authority within the City’s Coastal Zone. See Ibarra v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 182 Cal.App.3d 687, 696 (1986) (Commission’s “primary duties under 
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the coastal act are to grant or deny permits for coastal development . . . . and 
approve or disapprove [LCPs]”).  
The Ordinance is a lawful exercise of municipal legislative authority, 
consistent with the stated purposes of the Coastal Act, and not procedurally subject 
to Coastal Commission review. Moreover, even if there were a significant issue as 
to the merits of Appellants’ pendent Coastal Act claim, an injunction based on that 
claim could apply to only the 18 percent of Santa Monica that lies within the 
Coastal Zone and would not address the harms Appellants allege. For all these 
reasons, the district court’s order denying issuance of a preliminary injunction on 
this basis should be affirmed. 
A. Background: The Coastal Commission Has Only Limited 
Approval Authority Over Local Legislation  
Under California law, the authority to regulate land use flows from the 
constitutional police power: “A county or city may make and enforce within its 
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict 
with general laws.” Cal. Const., Art. XI, §7. “Conflicts exist if the ordinance 
duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either 
expressly or by legislative implication.” Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 7 
Cal.4th 725, 747 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]hen local government regulates in 
an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, such as the location of 
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particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of 
preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by 
state statute.” Big Creek Lumber Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149 
(2006) (citing IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, 1 Cal.4th 81, 93 
(1991)).  
The California Legislature has expressed its intent to retain the maximum 
degree of local control over land use. See, e.g., Gov. Code §§65800, 65802; IT 
Corp., 1 Cal.4th at 89. The Coastal Act itself expressly preserves the constitutional 
police power of municipalities absent a clear conflict with the Act’s explicit terms. 
See CPRC §30005(a), (b). The California Supreme Court has held that “the 
wording of the Coastal Act does not suggest preemption of local planning by the 
state; rather, under the language of section 30005, local governments have the 
authority to zone land to fit any of the acceptable uses under the policies of the act 
and have the discretion to be more restrictive than the Act.” Conway v. City of 
Imperial Beach, 52 Cal.App.4th 78, 85 (1997) (citing Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal.3d 
561, 572–573 (1984)).  
The Coastal Act grants the Commission authority to certify LUPs, which are 
policy documents “showing the land uses to be permitted in the Coastal Zone and 
continuing policies for carrying out the goals of the Coastal Act.” ER-721; see also 
CPRC §§30108.5, 30512, 30512.2. Santa Monica has a certified LUP. ER-708-
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789. The Commission has authority to review and approve amendments to this 
LUP. See CPRC §30512(c).  
The Coastal Commission has not yet certified any implementing zoning or 
other land use ordinances (which would constitute the additional components of an 
LCP, see CPRC §30108.6), and as a result Santa Monica does not have a certified 
LCP. ER-238, 243; see 70 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 220, 1987 WL 247254 at *2 (Sep. 
10, 1987) (“AG Op”) (“city may have a certified LUP for its coastal zone without a 
certified LCP”).  
As noted above, where a city has submitted implementing ordinances as part 
of its LCP certification process, or where a city seeks to amend implementing 
ordinances that are part of a previously certified LCP, the Commission may review 
and certify or reject and request modifications to those implementing ordinances. 
See CPRC §§30513; 30514(a); Douda v. California Coastal Com’n, 159 
Cal.App.4th 1181, 1192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Once an LCP is certified, any 
amendments thereto (including any amendments to any implementing ordinances 
that make up the certified LCP) are effective only if and when the Coastal 
Commission certifies them. See CPRC §30514(a), (b), (e).  
These limited powers are the extent of the Commission’s relevant authority 
to review and approve City zoning and other land use ordinances that apply in the 
City’s Coastal Zone. See Ibarra, 182 Cal.App.3d at 696.  
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B. Procedurally, the Ordinance Is Not Subject to Coastal 
Commission Approval 
1. The Ordinance is not an amendment to the City’s LUP  
Appellants contend that the Ordinance constitutes an unauthorized 
“amendment” to the City’s certified LUP. AOB-55-56. They do not, however, 
contend that the Ordinance directly amends any provision of the LUP. Instead, 
they argue, the Ordinance worked an effective amendment to the LUP because it 
seeks to impose in the Coastal Zone “further conditions, restrictions or limitations” 
on land use that “conflict” with the Coastal Act or with the provisions of the City’s 
certified LUP. AOB-55-56. At the time its LUP was certified, however, Santa 
Monica’s permissive zoning scheme did not expressly permit, and as a result under 
well-settled principles of California land use law prohibited, any short-term rentals. 
See Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena, 21 Cal.App.5th 1086 
(2018) (permissive zoning is valid method of prohibiting marijuana dispensaries); 
City of Corona v. Naulls, 166 Cal.App.4th 418 (2008) (“where a particular use of 
land is not expressly enumerated in a city’s municipal code as constituting a 
permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible”) (emphasis in original). 
As the record demonstrates, short-term rentals have not been a permitted use, and 
thus have been prohibited, in every residential zoning district in Santa Monica 
since at least 1988. ER-855-873 (1988 Zoning Ordinance Permitted Uses); ER-
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942-951 (Amended Zoning Ordinance); ER-984-1039 (current Zoning Ordinance). 
Appellants contend that despite this clear record, home sharing was actually 
permitted throughout Santa Monica prior to the Ordinance, and that the Ordinance 
therefore constitutes a new restriction on use, inconsistent with the LUP, that is an 
effective amendment to that LUP requiring Commission approval. In support, 
Appellants make four arguments.  
First, Appellants rely on a California Attorney General Opinion, which they 
contend requires Commission review whenever a city seeks to impose further 
conditions, restrictions, or limitations on land use in the Coastal Zone, if the 
changes conflict with any certified LUP. AOB-at 56. In the cited opinion, the 
Attorney General concluded that “local action [including an ordinance] which 
prohibits a use of land in the coastal zone which is authorized by a certified LCP or 
LUP ‘amends’ such certified LCP or LUP . . . and therefore does not become 
effective until it is certified by the Commission.” AG Op 1987 WL 247254 at *6. 
This conclusion has no application here because the LUP did not itself authorize 
short-term rentals. Indeed, the LUP, as written, neither promotes nor expressly 
permits short-term rentals. ER-708-788. Even assuming that prior to the Ordinance 
the City’s zoning ordinances authorized short-term rentals (which, as discussed 
above, they did not), the Ordinance would amend those zoning ordinances, not the 
LUP, which did not even mention short-term rentals. Moreover, as discussed 
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above, at the time the LUP was certified, the City’s permissive zoning scheme 
prohibited short-term rentals, meaning that the Ordinance did not prohibit any land 
use not already prohibited by zoning ordinances in effect at the time of the LUP’s 
certification. Finally, because the Ordinance’s limits on short-term rentals serve to 
decrease the removal of residential housing, including affordable housing, they are 
consistent with the stated LUP goal to encourage “preservation of low and 
moderate income housing within the Coastal Zone.” ER-772. 
Second, Appellants rely on a letter in which a Commission staff member 
states that the Commission “has interpreted local zoning ordinances in a broad 
fashion and found that vacation rentals are a form of residential use, permitted by 
right, in any residentially zoned area unless such uses are specifically prohibited or 
otherwise restricted.” AOB-55 (citing ER-289). This letter is not binding on this 
Court, nor would it be afforded deference by the California courts. See, e.g., 
Harlick v. Blue Shield of California, 686 F.3d 699, 716–17 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Positions taken by an agency for purposes of litigation ordinarily receive little 
deference under California law.”); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1, 7-8 (1998) (“Considered alone and apart from the 
context and circumstances that produce them, agency interpretations are not 
binding or necessarily even authoritative.”). The letter is also not persuasive. It 
cites no legal authority to support its assertion, which conflicts both with the line of 
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California cases discussed above affirming that permissive zoning schemes 
implement actual prohibitions and with the City’s interpretation of its own zoning 
ordinances, which, as discussed below, is entitled to deference.  
Third, Appellants contend “the record shows that properties historically 
were available for short-term rentals in Santa Monica. AOB-56 (citing ER1815). 
They cite a transcription of a portion of the April 28, 2015 City Council meeting at 
which the Ordinance was considered, which does not support this contention. To 
the contrary, the excerpt includes a City staff member confirming a Council 
member’s statements that Santa Monica’s zoning laws “prohibited short-term 
rentals of 30 days or less across the board” and that “to the extent we’re now 
allowing this home sharing option, in a way, we are liberalizing our regulations 
about short-term stays.” ER-1815. This is consistent with the staff report submitted 
in support of the Ordinance and the findings contained in the Ordinance, which 
reference preservation of “the City’s prohibition on vacation rentals” and new 
authorization of “home-sharing.” ER-30, 1058, 1062 The City’s interpretation of 
its own zoning ordinances is entitled to deference. MHC Operating Limited 
Partnership v. City of San Jose, 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 219 (2003).  
Finally, Appellants point to the absence from the record of “evidence of any 
action to prevent, stop, or punish a resident from offering their home for a short-
term rental before” implementation of the Ordinance. AOB-at 56-57. The district 
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court noted the absence of any such evidence, but correctly, given the record 
otherwise establishing the City’s pre-existing longstanding ban on short term 
rentals, held that Appellants had not “demonstrated a likelihood of success” on 
their claim that the Ordinance amended the LUP. Concurrently with this brief, the 
City is submitting a request for judicial notice containing both administrative 
citations and a criminal complaint that demonstrate the City’s efforts to enforce the 
ban on short-term rentals in place prior to passage of the Ordinance. See Exhibits A 
and B to motion for judicial notice. These enforcement efforts confirm that the 
Ordinance did not amend the LUP, either expressly or in effect. A California 
Superior Court decision has reached the same conclusion. See Hayek v. City of 
Santa Monica, No. 17STLC02007 (LA Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2018)(unpublished); 
(Ordinance is “not an unauthorized amendment to [the] City’s LUP”) (Opinion at 
9). 17  
2. The Ordinance does not constitute development subject to 
Coastal Commission approval 
Because Santa Monica does not have a certified LCP, the Coastal 
Commission retains authority to issue, and must approve, all CDPs for 
                                           
17 The unpublished opinion in Hayek is Exhibit C to a concurrently-filed 
motion for judicial notice.  
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development within the City’s Coastal Zone. See CPRC §30600(c). Appellants 
argue that the Ordinance “constitutes ‘development’ and therefore requires a CDP 
from the Commission.” AOB-at 57.  
Neither the text of the Coastal Act nor a single reported case in almost a half 
century of Coastal Act litigation supports this position. California state court 
decisions have strongly suggested that a municipal ordinance is not “development” 
under the Coastal Act, and thus not subject to Commission review. See, e.g., City 
of Dana Point v. California Coastal Commission, 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 188-193, 
205-09 (2013) (Commission had no jurisdiction to review municipal ordinance but 
could take actions against actual developments -- e.g. gates limiting beach access 
and implementation of time limits for beach access -- authorized by ordinance that 
were inconsistent with Coastal Act and city’s LUP).  
Consistent with this longstanding law, the California Court of Appeal 
recently considered and rejected the argument that municipal ordinances are 
generally subject to Commission review outside the LCP certification process. In a 
case involving a Coastal Act challenge to a Hermosa Beach ordinance prohibiting 
short-term rentals in residential districts, the court upheld the ordinance, finding 
that it “was enacted pursuant to the City’s police power and did not fall under the 
auspices of the Coastal Commission.” Johnston v. City of Hermosa Beach, No. 
B278424, 2018 WL 458920 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2018) (unpublished), 
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review denied (Apr. 11, 2018). Similarly, in Hayek, a California Superior Court 
determined that the Ordinance “is not a development permit and the Commission’s 
authority does not extend to approving or rejecting general laws adopted by cities.” 
Opinion at 9. 
Appellants rely (AOB-58) on a December 6, 2016, letter signed by the then-
Chair of the Coastal Commission that states “regulation of short-term/vacation 
rentals . . . constitutes development.” ER-227. As discussed above, this letter does 
not bind this Court. See, Harlick, 686 F.3d at 716–17; Yamaha, 19 Cal. 4th at 7-8. 
Nor is it persuasive. It contains no citation to legal authority to support this 
assertion, and is contrary to the approach of Dana Point, discussed above.  
The additional cases cited by Appellant address private action, not municipal 
legislation, and are not on point here. See Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores 
Community Association, 21 Cal.App.5th 896, 901 (2018) (short-term rental 
(“STR”) bans are “a matter for the City and Coastal Commission” and “may not be 
regulated by private actors”); Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 14 
Cal.App.5th 238, 249-55 (2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-1198 (U.S. Feb. 26, 
2018) (private parties “conduct in closing public access to Martins Beach [through 
erection of beach closure signs and permanent closure of existing gate] constituted 
‘development’ requiring a CDP”); Gualala Festivals Comm. v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 183 Cal.App.4th 60, 67-70 (2010) (private party required to obtain CDP 
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for fireworks display over coastal estuary). The distinction between private entities 
and local governments is a critical one. Private actors are not empowered to 
regulate land use as the City is, under both the California Constitution (Art. XI. §7) 
and the Coastal Act (CPRC §30005(a), (b)). These cases therefore do not address 
the issue here, whether a City’s municipal ordinance constitutes “development” 
requiring Coastal Commission approval. Other California cases make clear that it 
does not. The district court did not err in finding that Appellants failed to meet 
“their burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on this issue.” ER-8. 
3. The Ordinance Is Substantively Consistent With the 
Coastal Act 
The Ordinance reflects a balancing of interests consistent with the Coastal 
Act: it liberalized a longstanding prohibition on short-term rentals to authorize 
commercial home sharing, thereby promoting access to the coast, see CPRC 
§30210, while protecting the availability and affordability of housing in Santa 
Monica, see id. §30604 (f), (g) (directing Commission to “encourage housing 
opportunities for persons of low and moderate income”). See also Cal. Gov’t Code 
§65590 (laws authorizing and encouraging moderate and low-income housing 
protections apply within Coastal Zone); ER-772 (“Santa Monica LUP shall 
encourage the preservation of low- and moderate-income housing within the 
Coastal Zone consistent with the Coastal Act policies contained herein”). The 
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Ordinance is not, as Appellants would label it, a “blanket vacation rental ban” of 
the type that the Commission has rejected when reviewing proposed amendments 
to zoning ordinances constituting part of a certified LCP. See AOB-54; ER-249-51 
(noting Commission actions rejecting certain proposed prohibitions of short-term 
rentals, and approving, sometimes with requested modifications, certain proposed 
restrictions on short-term rentals).  
Commission staff reports on proposed amendments to certified LCPs 
seeking to limit previously authorized short-term lodgings (“STLs”) recognize that 
recent surges in STLs pose complex policy questions that may be answered in 
different ways depending on particular “applicable community and area specific 
factors.” ER-279. Commission staff has recognized, for example, city concerns 
with “STL rentals causing problems (e.g. noise, disorderly conduct, traffic 
congestion, excessive trash, etc.) that could negatively impact residents and 
communities, reducing the long-term rental housing stock, and unduly burdening 
City services.” ER-265, 271, 278-79.18  
The Ordinance, which liberalized Santa Monica’s long-standing prohibition 
on all short-term rentals in favor of permitting home-sharing (subject to certain 
                                           
18 The views of Commission staff are not binding, and the proposed 
amendments under discussion related to changes to implementing ordinances that 
were part of certified LCPs. As discussed above, the City does not have a certified 
LCP.  
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limitations) throughout Santa Monica reflects just such a balancing of interests 
premised on Santa Monica’s particular circumstances. As such, it does not 
substantively conflict with the Coastal Act.  
C. An Injunction Based On Appellants’ Coastal Act Claim Will Not 
Provide The Relief They Seek 
This Court should affirm the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to 
enjoin the Ordinance because Appellants cannot prevail on their Coastal Act claim. 
Even if Appellants presented a more persuasive claim, an injunction on this ground 
would apply to only the 18 percent of Santa Monica that lies within the coastal 
zone and would revert the City to its previous complete prohibition on short-term 
rentals, in place before the City Council adopted the Ordinance.  
IV. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
FAVOR THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
The balance of hardships and the public interest strongly favor the City and 
support the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The district court did 
not address these factors, finding that a preliminary injunction should be denied 
because Appellants failed to meet their burden of proving a likelihood of success 
on the merits of any their claims. ER-9, 11, 12; Compare, Am. Trucking 
Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009) 
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(reaching harms analysis only after concluding “it is likely that many of [the 
challenged] provisions are preempted.”).  
Santa Monica’s elected City Council unanimously concluded that the 
Ordinance serves the public’s interest. ER-1585-87. Courts generally defer to such 
legislative findings of public interest. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
(1954). Even putting deference aside, it is clear that California’s and Santa 
Monica’s housing crisis is real, and the impacts of rampant, unchecked short-term 
rentals are documented. ER-1405, 1410, 1411-1419. The Ordinance 
unquestionably serves to protect diminishing affordable housing stock, preserve 
residential communities, and facilitate coastal access, all via reasonable 
regulations. 
Public interest is also served by courts ensuring prompt implementation of 
duly adopted legislation. Absent a clear showing that laws are unconstitutional, it 
is in the public interest to ensure that the City’s carefully crafted and duly passed 
laws are timely implemented. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 
315, 318 (1943). 
The balance of hardships also tips heavily in the City’s favor. An injunction 
would allow Appellants to continue to profit from Ordinance-violating short-term 
rentals in Santa Monica, while simultaneously encouraging landlords to take 
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affordable and rent-controlled housing off the market, likely never to return. ER-
1411. Enforcement of the Ordinance, by contrast, will not irreparably harm 
Appellants -- they lose only money derived from rentals that violate the Ordinance. 
See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 
1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (“monetary injury is not normally considered 
irreparable.”). Appellants have demonstrated their ability to continue operations 
under a similar regulatory scheme -- they have been operating under an almost 
identical ordinance in San Francisco for almost a year now, and they have not gone 
bankrupt, nor has the internet been irreparably harmed. Compliance with the 
Ordinance is made simpler by the City’s posting of its registry of licensed home-
share properties on line and the City has committed to work with Appellants to 
facilitate compliance with the Ordinance. ER-68. 
 
 
 
 
 
/// 
 
/// 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the district 
court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 
Dated: May 16, 2018   Respectfully submitted, 
LANE DILG 
City Attorney 
 
By: /s/ Michael R. Cobden  
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
City of Santa Monica is not aware of any related cases that are currently 
pending in this Court. 
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